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1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are regarded as a tool for restructuring the ownership and con-
trol of plants. Much of the literature views M&As as a way to improve the allocation of resources
towards more efficient firms and owners by improving the match between the firm and its plants
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2008; Lucas, 1978; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987; Maksimovic and Phil-
lips, 2002; Maksimovic et al., 2011). For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) argue that below
average productivity of a plant is a signal of a bad match and an indicator for the firm to sell
the plant.1 Siegel and Simons (2010) take this perspective of M&As as a matching between firms
and plants to the match between workers and plants and argue that new owners “will recognize
the opportunity to improve the sorting and matching of workers across plants. They discard un-
productive workers, upgrade existing workers’ skills, and hire new workers whose skills benefit the
organization” (ibid. p. 904). This may explain why, for the affected workers, ownership change is
often associated with fears over job losses. Indeed, governments have intervened with the aim of
preserving jobs in some of the larger foreign takeovers in recent years, such as the French govern-
ment in the bid of General Electric for Alstom and the UK government in Pfizer’s bid for Astra
Zeneca.2
This paper provides an empirical exploration of the adjustments to the size and composition of
the workforce that occur around ownership change. Is ownership change followed by substantial
downsizing? Do new owners seize the opportunity to make changes to the workforce of the plant?
And does this lead to an improvement in the quality of the workforce or the quality of worker-plant
match quality after the ownership change? Siegel and Simons (2010) associate the notion of match
quality to observable characteristics such as education, skills and wages. We first document how
1Their argument for firm and plant matching in M&As is based on the theory of job turnover in Jovanovic
(1979).
2See, e.g., http://fortune.com/2014/11/05/france-gives-green-light-to-ges-alstom-acquisition/
for the Alstom case and for the Astra Zeneca case http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-07/
pfizer-has-cameron-channeling-hollande-amid-job-fears. The UK government intervened despite the ab-
sence of provisions for government intervention in the case of foreign takeovers in British law. Countries like the
U.S., Canada, France and Australia have direct legal mechanisms to halt foreign acquisitions.
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worker transitions around ownership change affect the composition of the work force in terms of
observable worker characteristics. Our main contribution to the literature on ownership change
and employment is to provide a first assessment of changes to the composition of the workforce
in terms of unobservable characteristics that can proxy for match quality. We use estimates of
unobservable worker-fixed effects and match-fixed effects from Mincer wage equations to study the
development of average worker and match quality at the plant level from before to after ownership
change. We use comprehensive census and register data for Norwegian manufacturing plants and
their employees for the period from 1996 to 2007 to investigate these transitions around both
foreign and domestic ownership change.
The management perspective referred to in the first paragraph suggests that ownership change
is an opportunity to effect changes in the workforce which ideally results in a workforce that is
better matched to the plant and the new owners. Based on this, we expect to observe higher than
usual worker turnover around acquisitions, and we start our analysis by documenting patterns in
labour turnover around ownership change. There are only a few studies using matched employer-
employee data that we are aware of that provide evidence on this. One example is the study by
Csengo¨di et al. (2008) using data on foreign acquisitions in Hungary; they document a substantially
higher share of new workers in the year of acquisition than the years before and after. Pesola
(2009) finds increased job separation hazards following both domestic and foreign acquisitions
in a sample of Finnish matched employer-employee data for 1990–2002. Although not based on
matched employer-employee data, Davis et al. (2014) provide evidence of excess job reallocation
following private equity buy-outs in the US.
Even in the absence of excess labour turnover, new owners may change the composition of
the workforce by being more selective in their hires and separations. If new owners bring in new
technology or new management practices, they may want to adjust the workforce (for example
by skill upgrading) to complement these changes. We further investigate whether the worker
turnover that we observe is associated with changes in the level of employment and changes in
the skill and age composition of the workforce. This relates our paper to the empirical literature
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on employment effects of ownership change. Previous studies on the effects of ownership change
on the level of employment are not conclusive.3 In terms of the effects on observable aspects of
workforce composition, results again differ between studies.4
We find above average worker turnover at the plant level around acquisitions. In plants subject
to domestic acquisitions this is associated with downsizing at the cost of high-skilled workers before
the acquisition. From before to after domestic ownership change we also find a small reduction
in the share of high-skilled workers, but no lasting changes to the age distribution of workers.
Around foreign acquisitions the excess turnover does not give rise to a reduction in employment,
nor significant changes to the skill or age composition of workers. In addition to this plant-level
perspective on turnover, we also document that the probability of separation, from the perspective
of workers, is higher when they work in a plant close to acquisition than in other periods of their
career.
The ambiguous evidence from existing studies on changes to the skill composition after own-
ership change, does not rule out that systematic changes to the composition of the workforce take
place as plants may screen workers along dimensions that are not observable in research data sets.
Recent theoretical models that link globalization to sorting in the labour market put forward the
idea that high-productivity firms have strong incentives to screen when selecting their workers.
For example, in the model in Helpman et al. (2010), firms may use resources to screen ex-ante
similar workers in order to select workers that are a good match to the firm ex-post. Because of
complementarities in production, high-productivity exporters screen more intensively and end up
with a workforce with higher average match quality than low-productivity firms. In this setting,
a reduction in trade costs will increase the returns to screening for exporting firms and therefore
3Negative employment effects of acquisitions are found for the UK by Conyon et al. (2002) and Hijzen et al.
(2013), and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that takeovers in the US are followed by a reduction in adminis-
trative overhead by cutting head-office employment. No significant change in employment levels following foreign
acquisitions are found for Brazil and Germany (Hijzen et al., 2013), while positive effects are found for Sweden
(Bandick and Karpathy, 2011), Portugal and Indonesia (Hijzen et al., 2013).
4Csengo¨di et al. (2008) find an increase in the share of highly educated workers after foreign acquisition in a panel
of Hungarian manufacturing firms, Huttunen (2007) finds a reduction in the high-skill share in a panel of Finnish
establishments, while Almeida (2007) finds no changes in the level of education following foreign acquisitions in
Portugal.
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increase average match quality in exporting firms. Krishna et al. (2014) provide empirical evid-
ence from trade liberalization in Brazil consistent with this prediction.5 Given that firms which
are part of multinationals tend to outperform exporting firms in terms of productivity,6 plants
which become part of a multinational through foreign acquisition are likely to screen workers more
intensively, just as in the case of reduced export costs for exporting firms.
Our aim here is, therefore, to study changes in unobservable aspects of the workforce around
acquisitions. We use a measure of “innate” ability of workers captured by the unobserved worker-
fixed effect from the wage decomposition proposed by Abowd et al. (1999), and study the change
in average “worker quality” at the plant level from before to after ownership change. We also use
the unobserved fixed effect related to each job spell or worker-plant match as a measure of match
quality. This unobserved effect represents the wage or productivity premium associated with each
job match between a worker and a firm (Woodcock, 2011). An improvement in the average innate
ability of workers or the average match-fixed effect can be regarded as one piece of evidence of
the screening or selection that occurs in the labour turnover around acquisitions. By definition,
workers who remain in the same plant (during a period of ownership change) cannot contribute
to a change in the average worker- or match-fixed effect at the plant level. The new owners may
introduce changes in the firm that improve also the match between these stayers and the plant.
This may manifest in the form of higher wage growth or in longer continuation tenure than for
stayers in firms without ownership change. We investigate also these possibilities.
We find some evidence of firms selecting workers more carefully around foreign acquisitions. The
distribution of unobserved fixed effects for newly hired workers dominates that of workers who are
in the plant for a while; this difference is greater for workers in plants subject to foreign acquisitions.
This selection is associated with a significant increase in the average of unobserved worker- and
match-fixed effects at the plant level from before to after foreign acquisition. Workers who remain
5In a slightly different theoretical model, Davidson et al. (2008) predict that reduced trade costs should increase
the correlation between worker and firm quality, i.e., positive sorting, in comparative advantage industries. Using
data from Sweden, Davidson et al. (2014) find empirical support for this prediction.
6See Helpman et al. (2004) for a model and section 3 in Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for a summary of the
evidence.
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in the same plant around foreign acquisitions experience a wage increase from before to after
acquisition, there is little evidence of an increased probability of longer tenure however. Workers
who remain in plants subject to domestic acquisition around the acquisition do not experience
wage increases, and their probability to stay on in the plant is lower than that for similar workers
in plants that are not subject to acquisition in the short run.
Our results indicate that there is a substantial degree of disruption associated with acquisitions
- to what extent this is driven by the plant or the workers themselves we are unable to distinguish.
From the plants’ point of view the reallocation is conducive to an improved match between the plant
and the workers following foreign acquisitions, while this is not the case for domestic ownership
change.
In what follows, Section 2 introduces the data sets used in the analysis and provides descriptive
statistics. Section 3 documents changes in employment and the components of excess labour
turnover both from the perspective of the employees as well from the perspective of the plants
subject to acquisitions. Section 4 looks at the effects of the observed restructuring on the match
between the plant and its employees using our different proxies for match quality. Section 5
summarises and concludes.
2 Data and Definitions
2.1 Data sources and cleaning
In our analysis we use five different annual data bases for the years 1996–2007. All of these
data bases are censuses that can be linked to each other through firm or plant identifiers. All data
sources are administered by Statistics Norway. Our starting point is the Norwegian Manufacturing
Statistics, which is collected at the plant level. We keep only plants that are observed for at least
three years during 1996–2007 and do not have one or more missing years before they reappear in
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the manufacturing statistics. We further drop plants with on average less than three workers every
year or with average production value or total wage costs of less than one million NOK per year.
We identify foreign acquisitions by using the register of foreign ownership interests in Norwegian
firms (the SIFON register), and define a foreign acquisition of a plant as occurring in year t if the
largest foreign ownership share is above 50% in year t, but was below this threshold in year t− 1.
We are further interested in plants that experience a change of ownership from one Norwegian
owner to a different Norwegian owner. In order to identify these domestic acquisitions, we use the
plant and firm identifiers in the manufacturing statistics. While the plant identifiers are connected
to a specific location with production in a specific industry, the firm identifier is related to the
legal owner. A plant experiences a domestic ownership change in year t if the plant changes firm
identifier from year t − 1 to year t, and the new firm id in year t owned other plants in t − 1.
Further, the plant must not be defined as foreign owned in either year t or t − 1. We do observe
plants with more than one ownership change and cases where the foreign ownership share drops
from above to below 50%. Due to the small number of these cases we drop these plants from our
analysis.7
We then link the income tax files, which contain information on job spells and the associated
earnings over the course of a job spell for individuals, to the plant panel. Based on this match,
we drop plants that have one or more years without any matched workers from the job-spell data.
The resulting plant panel at this stage accounts for between 68 and 71% of total employment and
between 74 and 77% of total production in the full manufacturing statistics in each year. We then
use register data on the whole population to include individual characteristics like age, gender
and education.8 With the workers and job spells we have linked to manufacturing plants at this
7In earlier work we also identified domestic plants that were taken over by Norwegian multinationals (Balsvik
and Haller, 2010). During our sample period we are able to identify less than 20 such cases and therefore drop
these plants from our analysis. The few studies that are able to identify domestic multinationals in their studies
of ownership change, (e.g., Heyman et al. (2007), Bandick and Go¨rg (2010) and Criscuolo and Martin (2009)),
typically find that the impact on firm performance is rather similar whether a domestic MNE or a foreign MNE
acquires a local firm.
82-3% of person identifiers with job spells in manufacturing plants according to the spell data, are not found in
the register data on the whole population. We drop these individuals.
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stage, we construct our plant-level variable for employment. In doing this we take the number
of workers employed by the plant at three different dates during the year (10th of each February,
June and October) and construct a measure of the number of workers as the average of these three
points during the year. Workers recorded working part time are given a lower weight than fulltime
workers.9 Finally, we use firm-level customs data to identify whether a plant belongs to a firm that
exports and/or imports. We use this information as part of our controls for plant characteristics
in regressions.
The final part of our cleaning procedures is related to the information in the job-spell data.
With spell-based data we have some workers in our panel that have more than one job and/or
workers that start several new jobs in the same year. In our analysis we are interested in following
individuals over time in their main jobs. In order to achieve this, we conduct the following cleaning
on the job-spell data: We drop all observations of individuals that are only observed for one
year in our panel. We also drop workers who do not work full-time in all the years they are in
manufacturing plants, workers who change jobs five times or more between plants in our panel,
workers with more than three parallel jobs in any one year, and workers who only have job spells of
less than 90 days. Further, we drop workers observed in more than three different plants during a
single year, and workers who seem to start a new job twice or more during a single year. Based on
information about earnings during the job spell and start and stop dates of the spell, we calculate
our wage measure as the daily wage during the job spell in a given year. Workers that always
earn less than 350 NOK per day are dropped from our sample.10 Finally, we exclude plants with
changes in the number of matched fulltime workers in excess of 250 from one year to the next.
After these cleaning procedures, we are left with about 67,000 plant-year observations from just
over 7,000 different plants for the period from 1996 to 2007. These plants employ in total over the
period more than 290,000 different workers giving rise to 1.77 million worker-year observations.
9The data contains a categorical variable for expected weekly work hours. One group being 30 hours or more
per week, these workers are given the weight of 1 in the calculations of the number of workers. Job spells with work
hours between 20 and 30 hours are given a weight of 0.65, while shorter work hours are given a weight of 0.3.
10This is based on the earnings deflated by the consumer price index, and represents a daily wage that would be
well below the expected average daily wage for a fulltime manufacturing worker in Norway.
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2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows that our plant panel consists of between 5,120 and 5,820 plants each year, with
an annual average of about 30 workers, amounting to 160,000–195,000 workers per year (columns
2–4). Columns 5–7 of table 1 provide information on the number of plants, their average size and
total number of workers subject to a domestic ownership change each year; columns 8–10 provide
similar information for plants subject to a foreign acquisition. In total, we observe 162 domestic
acquisitions and 427 foreign acquisitions. The number of workers in the acquired plants in the year
of acquisition ranges from 608 to 4,109 in foreign acquisitions and from 296 to 1,824 in domestic
acquisitions.
Table 1: Plants and workers involved in ownership change, by year
All plants Domestic acquisitions Foreign acquisitions
No. Employment No. Employment No. Employment
Year Mean Total Mean Total Mean Total
1996 5120 34 176199
1997 5462 34 185792 9 60 542 23 81 1854
1998 5711 34 195130 9 64 577 21 97 2032
1999 5650 33 188948 19 45 847 48 84 4019
2000 5747 31 180392 18 101 1824 62 70 4340
2001 5774 31 180864 30 48 1433 31 104 3236
2002 5808 30 176743 13 52 676 38 48 1820
2003 5820 29 168143 15 72 1083 43 28 1200
2004 5818 28 162980 7 42 296 21 29 608
2005 5677 28 160442 11 34 372 23 45 1042
2006 5477 29 160996 18 25 449 71 58 4109
2007 5211 31 160174 13 30 384 46 48 2214
Table 2 provides summary statistics of our worker panel. The average daily wage over the period
was 846NOK. Workers in plants ever subject to a domestic acquisition earn less than average, while
workers in plants ever subject to a foreign acquisition earn above average. We group workers into
three skill groups defined by years of education: low-skilled workers have less than 10 years of
education, medium-skilled workers have 10-13 years of education and high-skilled workers have
more than 13 years of education. Looking at the skill shares, the low-skill share in plants subject
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on worker panel
All workers Domestic acq Foreign acq
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Avg. daily wage (NOK) 845.6 332.6 826.1 319.3 892.1 350.7
- low skilled 725.6 249.7 711.4 251.1 747.1 250.9
- medium skilled 830.4 292.4 819.2 280.2 863.0 300.3
- high skilled 1132.9 435.5 1134.2 420.3 1177.0 438.7
Age 40.7 11.6 41.4 11.7 40.7 11.4
Tenure 8.2 6.9 9.1 7.4 8.0 6.7
Low skilled (%) 28.0 30.2 25.0
Medium skilled (%) 57.3 57.4 56.5
High skilled (%) 14.7 12.5 18.5
Females (%) 18.2 19.8 17.3
Obs 1,774,549 85,328 258,522
Note: Statistics on domestic and foreign acquisitions are for workers in plants ever
subject to an acquisition.
to domestic acquisitions is higher than the sample average, whereas the high-skill share is lower
than the sample average. In contrast, plants subject to foreign acquisitions have higher shares of
high-skilled workers and lower shares of low-skilled workers than the sample average.
As an additional descriptive exercise we compare employment, wages and productivity in plants
that are subject to an acquisition during our sample period to plants that do not experience
ownership change during the time span of our data. Henceforth, these plants are also called
non-acquired plants. We do this comparison by estimating OLS regressions of the following type:
yjt =
t+6∑
τ=t−6
αDτDom acqj,τ +
t+6∑
τ=t−6
αFτFor acqj,τ + γ ln empjt + γR + γt + γI + γIt + jt. (1)
The plant level outcome yjt is, in turn, the log of employment, the log average wage at the plant
level, labour productivity (the log of sales per employee) and TFP. For acqj,τ is a set of dummy
variables equal to one if the observation of worker i in plant j is: six years before foreign acquisition,
five years before, and so on, until six years after foreign acquisition. We construct a similar set
of indicators around domestic acquisitions. In the regressions, we control for plant size and also
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include dummy variables for labour market region, year, 2 digit NACE industry, and industry-year
interactions.11
Figure 1: Characteristics of plants subject to acquisitions
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Note: Graphical representation of regression results from estimating equation (1). Year t =
year of acquisition. Dots indicate significance at 5% or better (standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the plant level).
Figure 1 plots the estimated coefficients on the dummies around ownership change. The em-
ployment premium for acquisition plants relative to non-acquired plants is in the order of 60 to
70%. Relative to the average of non-acquired plants, there is a slight decrease in employment
in the years leading up to ownership change. This starts three years before foreign acquisitions,
while in the case of domestic acquisitions there is a sharp drop in employment only in the year
of acquisition. Plant-level average wages and labour productivity are higher in plants subject to
foreign acquisitions, and these measures increase relative to industry-year average (of non-acquired
plants) following acquisitions. Also plants subject to domestic acquisition see a rise in their la-
11We do not control for plant size in the regression where the outcome variable is plant size.
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bour productivity, but average wages do not differ significantly from those in non-acquired plants.
When it comes to total factor productivity (TFP), there is no clear evidence of a productivity
premium in acquisition plants prior to acquisition, though it seems to be the case that foreign-
owned plants have significantly higher productivity than average from four years after ownership
change onwards.12
Table 3: Average worker retention rates over 2-year periods
Work in Work in Work outside Not
Workers in plants same plant other plant our panel working
never subject to acq. 0.73 0.04 0.13 0.10
before for. acq. (t− 3 to t− 1) 0.69 0.04 0.13 0.14
around for. acq. (t− 1 to t+ 1) 0.70 0.04 0.12 0.14
after for. acq (t+ 1 to t+ 3) 0.70 0.05 0.14 0.11
before dom. acq. (t− 3 to t− 1) 0.63 0.05 0.13 0.19
around dom. acq. (t− 1 to t+ 1) 0.63 0.06 0.19 0.12
after dom. acq (t+ 1 to t+ 3) 0.71 0.04 0.14 0.12
Note: Year t = year of acquisition. Workers classified as working outside our panel are found in
other sectors of the economy or in manufacturing plants dropped in the cleaning procedures. Workers
classified as not working are comprised of two main groups: The first group are people who are not
observed in our employer-employee data files meaning they are either unemployed or out of the labour
force. The second group are people where we observe an employer id, but their total annual earnings
are below 50,000NOK.
Table 3 presents average two-year retention rates for different types of plants. We calculate
this as the share of workers present in a plant who are still employed by the same plant two
years later. The retention rate for plants never subject to acquisition (in the first row) is 73%.
Of the non-retained workers; 4% are found in other plants in our sample, 13% are working with
employers outside our sample of manufacturing firms, and 10% are not working. Table 3 also shows
average retention rates calculated over different two-year periods relative to the year of ownership
change (t. In plants close to ownership change – whether this is just before, during, or just after
the ownership change – worker retention rates are lower than in plants not subject to ownership
change. The retention rate is particularly low (63%) for plants experiencing a domestic ownership
change in the near future.
12The TFP measure is based on estimates using the procedure suggested by Ackerberg et al. (2008).
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3 Turnover around acquisitions
The descriptive evidence in the previous section indicates that acquisitions are associated with
changes in employment and wages at the plant level, and relatively low retention rates. Lower
retention rates may suggest downsizing, but excess worker turnover could also give rise to low
retention rates without implying downsizing if excess separations are accompanied by new hires.
If ownership change is a type of event where the opportunity and the need to improve the match
between workers and the plant is particularly large, we should observe excess turnover following
ownership change; with or without downsizing as a result.
We compare turnover in acquisition plants to turnover in plants not subject to acquisition, by
estimating equation (1) with the outcome variables being, respectively, the share of workers in the
plant who will not be present in the plant next year (separations), and the share of workers who
are present in the plant for the first time (new hires). Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients on
the dummies around ownership change. The figure documents excess turnover, particularly in the
form of separations. In the year of domestic acquisition, the share of leaving workers is on average
about 10 percentage points higher than in the average non-acquired plant in the same industry and
year; representing a doubling relative to the average leave rate of 9%. In plants subject to foreign
acquisitions, the share of leaving workers is also significantly higher than in non-acquired plants
from the year of acquisition to two years after acquisition, but in economic terms the difference
is not quite as stark as in the case of domestic acquisitions. The share of newly hired workers is
not significantly different from average close to and after ownership change, though the share of
new hires is above average in plants subject to foreign acquisitions in some of the years before the
acquisition.
The lower retention rates shown in table 3 and the excess turnover, primarily in the form of
separations, shown in figure 2, suggest that plants that are acquired might be downsizing in the
period around the acquisition. We investigate the extent of downsizing by regressing the log change
in plant-level employment over different periods on indicator variables for the plant experiencing a
13
Figure 2: Share of newly hired and leaving workers at the plant level
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Note: Graphical representation of regression results from estimating equation (1). Year t =
year of acquisition. Dots indicate significance at 5% or better (standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the plant level). The mean share of workers going to leave (being newly hired)
in the data is 0.09 (0.11).
foreign or a domestic acquisition, while controlling for region, year and 2-digit industry dummies
as well as initial plant size. Results are presented in the upper panel of table 4. The first three
columns display the change in employment from three years before the acquisition until the year of
acquisition, one year after, and three years after the acquisition. The last three columns show the
change in employment from the year before acquisition until one, two, and three years after. In
column 1 we see clear evidence of downsizing in the years leading up to domestic ownership change.
Also for the other periods that we look at, the estimated coefficients on the domestic acquisition
indicator are negative, but not statistically significant.13 In the case of foreign acquisitions, the
13Note that there are fewer plants subject to domestic than to foreign acquisitions in our sample. Thus, these
estimates tend to be estimated with greater error as well.
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development in employment does not differ significantly from that of non-acquired plants in any
of the periods around acquisition that we look at.14
The bottom three panels of table 4 report changes to the skill composition in plants around
the time of acquisition. The downsizing prior to domestic acquisitions that is evident in the upper
panel of the table, is primarily associated with a decline in the share of high-skilled workers. For
plants subject to foreign acquisitions, we find no changes in the skill composition of these plants.
In a similar approach as with the skill shares, we also check for changes in the age distribution of
workers. Here, we divide the worker population into four age groups that are broadly in line with
the quartiles of the age distribution in our data, and then compute changes in these shares over
the same periods around acquisition as in table 4. These results are presented in table 9 in the
appendix. Overall, there are no consistent and significant changes in the age-group shares from
three years before to three years after acquisitions.
The excess turnover documented in figure 2 may play out differently for workers of different
skill levels. Using our worker-level data we estimate the probabilities of being separated from – or
being newly hired to – a plant in the years around acquisition. We estimate the following linear
probability model
yijt =
t+2∑
τ=t−2
αDτFor acqj,τ +
t+2∑
τ=t−2
αFτDom acqj,τ +Xitβ +Xjtγ + it, (2)
where yijt in the separation regressions is the indicator variable leaveijt which is equal to one
if worker i is observed in plant j in year t, but will not be observed in this plant the following
year.15 Our main interest is whether for a given worker the probability of separation is higher
when she is employed in a plant that is close to ownership change compared to other periods
of the worker’s career. Time-varying observable individual and plant-level traits may affect the
probability of separation. The vector of individual-level control variables (Xit) includes age, tenure,
14Results are similar when including all plants, dropping only plants in the top and bottom half percentile of the
distribution of employment changes or excluding plants with median employment of less than 10 employees over
the period.
15Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separations.
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Table 4: Plant-level changes relative to non-acquired plants: employment and skill shares
Change in dependent variable from
3 years before acquisition to year 1 year before acquisition to year
of acq 1 after 3 after 1 after 2 after 3 after
Dependent variable: Employment
Foreign acquisition 0.001 -0.040 -0.054 0.002 0.039 -0.009
(0.027) (0.038) (0.048) (0.034) (0.033) (0.038)
Domestic acquisition -0.117 ∗ -0.088 -0.089 -0.090 -0.057 -0.084
(0.048) (0.063) (0.072) (0.057) (0.054) (0.064)
R2 0.094 0.107 0.137 0.072 0.094 0.106
Dependent variable: Share of low skilled
Foreign acquisition -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.019 ∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Domestic acquisition -0.018 0.018 0.009 0.028 (∗) 0.023 0.033
(0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
R2 0.010 0.011 0.018 0.007 0.010 0.011
Dependent variable: Share of medium skilled
Foreign acquisition -0.002 0.015 0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.014
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Domestic acquisition 0.040 ∗ -0.002 0.015 -0.024 -0.007 -0.012
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
R2 0.009 0.011 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.011
Dependent variable: Share of high skilled
Foreign acquisition 0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Domestic acquisition -0.021 ∗ -0.016 -0.024 (∗) -0.004 -0.016 ∗ -0.022 ∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Obs 39247 33696 23579 45092 39247 33696
R2 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.007
(∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions include region, year, 2-digit industry dummies and the level of employment at the start of the period.
To exclude mass-layoffs, the sample used drops observations where the change in employment from one year to the next
is in the top or bottom percentile.
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their square terms, and a dummy for union membership. Our plant-level controls (Xjt) consist of
log of employment and log production value, skill shares, the share of union membership at the
plant level, and dummies for export, import, and multiplant status. Unobserved individual effects
could be correlated with the probability of separation, thus we estimate equation (2) using worker-
fixed effects. In addition, we include region, year and 2-digit industry-year interaction terms to
make sure our results are not confounded by separations or ownership change being correlated
with regional differences or industry-specific shocks.16
The estimated coefficients on the indicator variables for the years around ownership change are
reported in figure 3.17 The upper left graph shows the results from a regression using all workers;
the three other graphs show the coefficients from estimating equation (2) separately by skill group.
Since the results are based on worker-fixed effects, the coefficients can be interpreted as deviations
from the individual worker’s mean over time. Thus, the upper left panel of figure 3 indicates
that the probability of separation is higher for workers when they are employed in a plant that is
close to acquisition than at other times. The higher separation probability is persistent and more
pronounced for workers in plants that experience domestic ownership change, while for workers
in plants subject to a foreign takeover, the probability of separation is higher than normal in the
year of acquisition and the year after. These results are consistent with the results on plant-level
turnover reported in figure 2. Figure 3 also makes it clear that in plants subject to domestic
acquisitions, it is the medium- and high-skilled workers that are more likely to face separations
around acquisition. For the high-skilled workers this is the case especially before the ownership
change. Given that the average probability of separation of high-skilled workers is around 6%, the
estimated coefficient of around 0.07 for high-skilled workers in the year of domestic acquisition
implies that the probability of separation is 7 percentage points higher relative to years further
16We want to condition separations on the plant being in existence after separations and we want to condition
new hires on the plant being in existence before hires, thus we drop observations in the year of plant entry and the
year of plant exit in both the separation and new hire regressions.
17The estimated coefficients are reported in table 10 in the appendix.
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from acquisition, or more than double compared to the average probability of separation in the
sample.
Figure 3: Probability of separation around acquisition
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Note: Graphical representation of regression results from estimating equation (2) with de-
pendent variable being an indicator for separation from the plant. Year t = year of acquis-
ition. Dots indicate significance at 5% or better (standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the plant level).
We also assess whether the probability of being new to a plant is higher around acquisitions than
at other times by re-estimating equation (2) using newijt as dependent variable. This indicator
variable equals one if worker i is observed in plant j in year t, but was not observed in this plant the
year before. The results are displayed in figure 4. Workers in plants subject to domestic acquisitions
have a higher probability of being newly hired to plants subject to domestic acquisitions in the year
of, and the year after ownership change. This effect is significant for the medium- and in particular
for the high-skilled workers, suggesting that the workers which separate before acquisition shown
in figure 3 are partly replaced by new hires after the ownership change.18 The probability of hire in
the year after domestic acquisition is about 6 percentage points higher than usual for high-skilled
18This is not driven by re-hiring of the same workers separated from the plant before the ownership change.
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Figure 4: Probability of hire around acquisition
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Note: Graphical representation of regression results from estimating equation (2) with de-
pendent variable being an indicator for new hire. Year t = year of acquisition. Dots indicate
significance at 5% or better (standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant level).
workers. Compared to the overall probability of hire of 8.4% in the sample of high-skilled workers,
this represents an increase in the hire probability of around 70%. The probability of being newly
hired to foreign acquisition plants is lower than usual, but seems to pick up two years after foreign
acquisitions for all skill groups. These effects are small in economic terms, however.
To summarize, our results indicate that acquisitions are associated with excess worker turnover,
primarily related to separations. Excess turnover is much more pronounced in plants subject to
domestic acquisitions, where downsizing occurs prior to ownership change. We find no evidence
of plants reducing the overall size of the workforce around foreign acquisition. For domestic
acquisitions, the downsizing prior to ownership change is driven by separations of medium- and
high-skilled workers that seem to be at least partly replaced by new hires after ownership change.
The outcome for domestic acquisitions is a small decline in the share of high-skilled workers,
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otherwise we find very few changes in the age and skill composition of the workforce around
acquisitions.
4 Match quality around acquisitions
Does the excess turnover documented in the previous section improve the match between the
plant and its workers? From the previous results we found that the changes in the age and skill
composition of the workforce around acquisitions do not differ markedly from changes in non-
acquired plants. If anything, we found a decline in the share of high-skilled workers following
domestic acquisitions. As firms may select their workers based on criteria other than only age and
skills which we observe in our data, the workforce could change systematically along unobservable
dimensions. Thus, in this section we explore other ways of assessing whether the turnover around
acquisitions results in an improvement in worker and match quality relative to plants not subject
to ownership change. First, in section 4.1 we look at the selection process in separations and hires,
by using measures of unobservable worker and match quality from Mincer wage regressions, and
by looking at the wage growth of new hires. By definition, the workers who stay in acquisition
plants from before to after acquisition cannot contribute to a change in the plant-level average
match quality, we therefore consider two alternative ways to assess whether there is any evidence
that ownership change is an event that seems to improve the match between these workers and the
plant. The metrics we use are wage growth and job tenure. The results are presented in section
4.2.
4.1 Selection in separations and new hires
To analyse the selection process in separations and hires, we turn to measures of unobserved worker
quality and unobserved worker-plant match quality that we obtain from estimating Mincer wage
equations. We make use of these two different estimated unobserved fixed effects in the following
ways: First, we look at the distribution of these fixed effects for our sample, where workers are
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grouped according to whether they are newly hired, leavers or stayers in their plants. Second, we
calculate the average of these fixed effects at the plant-year level and then document the change
in this average from before to after ownership change. We interpret a change in the average fixed
effect at the plant level as a change in match quality.
Based on the methodology in Abowd et al. (1999) (henceforth AKM) we estimate unobserved
worker-fixed effects from the following wage equation:
yijt = µ+ x
′
itβ + θi + ψj + ijt. (3)
The outcome variable, yijt, is the log wage of worker i at plant j in period t, and x
′
it is a vector
of observable time-varying covariates for the worker and the plant she works in.19 The fixed
effects for the worker and plant, respectively, are θi and ψj. The identification of the two high-
dimensional fixed effects relies on mobility of workers between plants, and we use the two-way
fixed effect estimation procedure developed by Cornelissen (2008) to implement the AKM wage
decomposition. We use the largest group of connected plants and workers, which includes about
91% of our sample, for this estimation.20
As an alternative and more direct measure of match quality, we estimate the wage equation
above replacing the worker- and plant-fixed effects with a single fixed effect that is specific to each
match between a worker and a plant, henceforth also called the match ore spell-fixed effect. While
the worker-fixed effect can be said to capture the innate ability of the worker that is transfer-
able across plants, the match effect captures a potential match-specific component to wages that
19The worker and plant characteristics included are the same as in the regressions for the probability of hire and
separations reported in the previous section, including also 2-digit industry-year interaction terms. In addition we
include a dummy for the year the worker is new to a plant and a dummy for the year that a worker is last observed
in the plant as well as an indicator for foreign ownership.
20We focus only on the worker-fixed effect from the AKM decomposition. The main interest in much of the
literature following AKM has been on the labour market correlation between the firm- and the worker-fixed effect,
see for example Goux and Maurin (1999). The approach has also been used to investigate the role of individual
and firm-specific components and assortative matching in explaining increased wage inequality, see, e.g., Bagger et
al. (2013) and Bagger and Lentz (2014) for Denmark and Card et al. (forthc) for Germany.
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measures the productivity of the match between the worker and the plant.21 If match effects are
important in wage determination, omitting the match specific component could bias the estimated
worker-fixed effects (Woodcock, 2011). The estimated returns to observable characteristics could
also be biased by omitting the match-specific component from equation 3. As an example, Wood-
cock (2011) and Sørensen and Vejlin (2013) using US and Danish data, respectively, find that the
returns to experience are overestimated in wage regressions that omit the match effect, as part of
the returns to experience are associated with workers moving towards better matches over time.
Replacing the worker- and plant-fixed effects in equation 3 with match-fixed effects means that
the match effects subsume the worker- and plant-fixed effects, and we need not include these in
our wage equation. This is of no cost to us, as we are interested in the change in the average of the
match effects over time within a plant. As the plant-fixed effect is, by definition, constant during
a job-spell, we do not need to separately identify the plant-fixed effect. We therefore interpret a
change in the average match effect at the plant level as a change in match quality, and are agnostic
about whether this is primarily due to worker turnover leading to a change in the unobserved
worker-fixed effect or a change in the unobserved match effect. Estimating equation (3) with
match effects has the additional advantage that the identification of the parameters of the wage
equation relies on weaker assumptions than in the case of the AKM-approach.22 The coefficients
on the observable worker and plant characteristics from the two different fixed effects regressions
are reported in table 11 in the appendix.
First, we compare the estimated unobserved worker-fixed effects from equation (3) across work-
ers. In the top panel of figure 5 we plot the cumulative distribution functions of the worker fixed
effect for leavers, stayers and new hires. The relative position of the lines in the figure shows that
21Match-specific wage components arise in models in which there is an idiosyncratic productivity component
associated with each potential job match, and workers receive some share of the rents from a successful match, see
for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
22The identifying assumption in the AKM approach is that the idiosyncratic disturbance term in each period is
mean independent of observable worker and plant characteristics as well as plant- and worker-fixed effects, i.e., that
worker mobility is random conditional on these effects. This assumption is at odds with for example the model of
match-specific ability in Helpman et al. (2010). In the match-effects approach the identifying assumption is that
worker mobility is random conditional on time-invariant match-specific worker ability and time-varying worker and
firm characteristics. See Krishna et al. (2014) for a discussion.
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new hires have a distribution that indicates higher unobserved quality than that of stayers, while
the opposite is true for the leavers. Figure 6 in the appendix uses the match-fixed effects instead.
The pattern is similar. Evidence of negative selection in separations is also found in the study
by Weynandt (2014), who uses data from Austria to compare the average ability of workers who
are laid off in single lay-offs from firms to the average ability of workers in mass-layoffs. This is
consistent with the idea that in general, turnover tends to improve the sorting in the labour market
(Jovanovic, 1979).
The middle panel of figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the estimated
unobserved worker-fixed effects of new hires after acquisitions relative to stayers in acquisition
plants. New hires after ownership change are defined as workers that are new to acquisition plants
in the year of acquisition or one or two years after the acquisition, while stayers are defined as
workers that are working in the plant consecutively from two years before to two years after the
acquisition. Again, the distribution of the worker-fixed effects for new hires after acquisitions
dominates that of stayers in the same plants. The difference between new hires and stayers is
greater after foreign than after domestic acquisitions, suggesting that the foreign-acquired plants
are recruiting better workers in terms of unobserved characteristics. The stayers in domestic and
foreign acquisition plants in this and the figure in the bottom panel are combined into one line
for readability as their distributions of unobserved fixed effects nearly overlap. The bottom panel
of figure 5 shows the distributions for the unobserved worker-fixed effects comparing leavers to
stayers. Compared to the clear negative selection of leavers relative to stayers in the full sample
shown in the top panel, the quality of leavers in newly acquired plants is not so clearly different
from that of stayers. If anything, the figure suggests that foreign acquired plants may be loosing
some of their good workers right after acquisition.
Second, the descriptive evidence shown in figure 5 does not tell us whether there are changes in
average worker quality at the plant level. Thus we use the estimated fixed effects from equation 3
to calculate the average of both the unobserved worker- and match-fixed effects for each plant-year
observation in our sample. From the resulting plant panel, we calculate the changes in worker-
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution functions of unobserved worker fixed effects
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and match-fixed effects over four- and five-year periods. We then compare the change in average
worker and match quality from before to after acquisitions to the change in non-acquired plants in
the same industry and over the same time period by regressing these changes on dummies for being
two or three years after an ownership change. The regressions include industry- and year-fixed
effects, and observations are weighted by the number of employees in the plants (i.e., the number
of fixed effects used to calculate the average at the plant level). The results in table 5 show that
plants experiencing a foreign acquisition experience a significantly larger improvement in both
unobserved worker quality and match quality relative to non-acquired plants in the same industry
and time-period. For plants subject to domestic ownership change, the improvement does not
differ from the average trend in non-acquired plants. To rule out the possibility that the difference
between domestic and foreign acquisitions found in table 5 is driven entirely by plants with large
downsizing, we report a robustness check where we drop the one percent of observations with the
largest downsizing in the number of employees over the four or five year periods investigated in the
table. The results are reported in table 12 in the appendix. The finding that the improvement in
worker and match quality in plants subject to foreign acquisitions is larger than that in domestically
acquired plants is robust to this sample restriction, although the estimated coefficients are smaller
in magnitude.
An alternative approach to study the extent of selection in new hires is to look for a premium
in wage growth for mobile workers. From the perspective of workers who change jobs, the wage
growth from the old to the new job could act as a measure of the extent to which the job change
results in an improved match for the worker. To investigate this, we identify workers who two years
ahead will be employed by a different plant than they are currently employed in, and calculate the
change in log wages that we observe from year t to t + 3.23 We keep only these moving workers
in our sample and regress their wage growth on indicator variables for the type of plant they are
moving to: plants never subject to acquisition and plants just before or just after an ownership
change. Different versions of these regressions are presented in table 6. Column 1 presents the
23Year t + 3 is the year after they are first observed in their new plant.
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Table 5: Overall change in match quality at the plant level around ownership change
Change from before to after acquisition in the average
unobserved worker-fixed effect unobserved match-fixed effect
Change from 2 years before to 3 years after acquisition
Foreign acq 0.013 (0.003)∗∗ 0.027 (0.006)∗∗
Domestic acq 0.005 (0.004) 0.012 (0.009)
Change from 2 years before to 2 years after acquisition
Foreign acq 0.008 (0.003)∗∗ 0.020 (0.005)∗∗
Domestic acq 0.003 (0.004) 0.007 (0.008)
Average fixed effect 0.030 0.023 0.034 0.028
Obs 20175 29207 20175 29207
R2 0.044 0.028 0.038 0.025
Note: All regressions include industry and year dummies and are weighted by the number of employees in
the plant. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the change in the plant-level average of unobserved
worker-fixed effects from a two-way fixed effect Mincer wage equation with plant- and worker-fixed effects,
including also worker and plant controls and region, industry and year interaction dummies. Dependent
variable in column 3 and 5 is the change in the plant-level average of unobserved match effect from a Mincer
wage equation with match effects, including the same controls. Standard errors in parentheses, (∗) p < 0.10,
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
result of an OLS regression with industry-year fixed effects. The constant term captures the average
three-year wage growth for movers to non-acquired plants: 7.3%. The estimated coefficients on
the indicator variables for which type of plant the other movers move to indicate to what extent
the wage growth of these movers differs from movers from the same industry and year that move
to plants never subject to ownership change. Movers to plants that were just acquired by foreign
owners exhibit higher wage growth than other movers; in economic terms the effect is not that
large though. This result is not affected by adding worker controls and plant controls for the plant
they are leaving in column 2. The results in columns 3 and 4 include plant-year fixed effects, thus
here we are comparing the wage growth of leavers from the same plant year, depending on their
type of destination plant. These results show much the same picture as the first two columns of
table 6.
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Table 6: Wage growth for movers: from year before leave to the second year in the new plant
Dependent variable: 3-year wage growth
Movers to plants:
1 or 2 years before foreign acq. 0.003 -0.001 0.011 0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.030)
0, 1 or 2 years after foreign acq. 0.066 0.062 0.041 0.039
(0.012) ∗∗ (0.012) ∗∗ (0.023) (∗) (0.022) (∗)
1 or 2 years before domestic acq. -0.010 0.008 0.006 0.014
(0.027) (0.026) (0.079) (0.077)
0, 1 or 2 years after domestic acq. 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.022
(0.013) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
constant 0.073 0.516 0.073 0.414
(0.002) ∗∗ (0.047) ∗∗ (0.002) ∗∗ (0.057) ∗∗
Worker controls No Yes No Yes
Plant controls No Yes No n/a
Industry-year fe Yes Yes No No
Plant-year fe No No Yes Yes
Obs 18619 18619 18619 18619
R2 adj 0.021 0.048 0.240 0.257
Note: The regression sample contains only within-sample movers grouped by the indicator variables
defined by which type of plant the movers move to in year t + 2. Standard errors in parentheses,
(∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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4.2 Match quality for stayers
Also for stayers, the quality of the match could change if there are changes at the plant level that
improve the fit between the worker and the plant. This will not be captured in our estimates of the
change in average match quality at the plant level in section 4.1, since by definition the workers
that remain in the same plant cannot contribute to a change in average match quality (both the
worker-fixed effect, and the match-fixed effect is constant for stayers). As an alternative measure
of the fit between the stayers and the plant we consider wage growth. We calculate wage growth
of stayers in plants subject to acquisition over two- and three-year periods. The set of stayers is
restricted to workers who are present in the year before ownership change and are still in the plant
two or three years after the ownership change. We compare their wage growth to that of stayers
in plants not subject to ownership change in the same industry and year; results are displayed in
table 7. While stayers in domestic acquisitions do not experience higher wage growth than stayers
in plants never subject to ownership change, stayers in foreign acquisitions do. The economic size
of the effect is small, however.
Table 7: Wage growth for stayers
Dependent variable:
2-year difference 3-year difference
(acq. occurred in t-1 or t-2) (acq. occurred in t-1 or t-2)
Stayers in for. acq 0.014 (0.005)∗∗ 0.011 (0.006)(∗) 0.019 (0.006)∗∗ 0.012 (0.006)(∗)
Stayers in dom. acq -0.003 (0.009) -0.000 (0.010) 0.003 (0.011) 0.006 (0.010)
cons 0.068 (0.001)∗∗ 0.249 (0.012)∗∗ 0.086 (0.001)∗∗ 0.305 (0.013)∗∗
Worker controls No Yes No Yes
Plant controls No Yes No Yes
Industry-year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 813551 813551 635748 635748
R2 adj 0.020 0.052 0.021 0.059
Note: The regression sample contains only stayers. In columns 1 and 2 stayers are defined as workers being in
the same plant from year t − 2 until at least year t. In columns 3 and 4 stayers are defined as workers being
in the same plant from year t − 3 until at least year t. The estimated coefficients are interpreted relative to
stayers in plants never subject to ownership change, their mean wage growth over 2 and 3 years are identified
by the constant term in columns 1 and 3, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, (∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01.
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The potential changes that may occur in the plant with the new owners could improve the fit
between the plant and its employees by resulting in increased job satisfaction - which of course
we cannot measure. What we can observe though is how long workers stay in a plant. If job
satisfaction increases, this may lead workers to stay longer in the plant. Thus, as our last exercise,
we look at continuation tenure as an alternative indicator of an improved match between the
stayers and the plant.
Table 8: Linear probability of stayers to remain in the plant for at least another 2, 3 or 4 years
All Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill
Probability of staying for at least 2 years in a plant that was
subject to for acq in previous year 0.016 (0.018) -0.004 (0.020) 0.020 (0.021) 0.038 (0.019)∗
subject to dom acq in previous year -0.112 (0.050)∗ -0.085 (0.046)(∗) -0.102 (0.051)∗ -0.209 (0.068)∗∗
Constant -0.635 (0.037)∗∗ -0.746 (0.035)∗∗ -0.592 (0.041)∗∗ -0.455 (0.050)∗∗
Obs 1047421 294900 602373 150148
R2 0.474 0.458 0.493 0.436
Probability of staying for at least 3 years in a plant that was
subject to for acq in previous year -0.000 (0.014) -0.004 (0.017) -0.000 (0.016) 0.012 (0.017)
subject to dom acq in previous year -0.056 (0.041) -0.054 (0.039) -0.059 (0.044) -0.042 (0.040)
Constant -0.520 (0.032)∗∗ -0.584 (0.031)∗∗ -0.495 (0.036)∗∗ -0.391 (0.040)∗∗
Obs 1047421 294900 602373 150148
R2 0.435 0.413 0.457 0.394
Probability of staying for at least 4 years in a plant that was
subject to for acq in previous year -0.007 (0.009) -0.012 (0.009) -0.012 (0.010) 0.021 (0.013)
subject to dom acq in previous year 0.010 (0.010) 0.013 (0.008)(∗) 0.010 (0.012) 0.006 (0.017)
Constant -0.356 (0.026)∗∗ -0.381 (0.023)∗∗ -0.348 (0.029)∗∗ -0.288 (0.031)∗∗
Obs 1047421 294900 602373 150148
R2 0.393 0.370 0.419 0.346
(∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant level in parentheses.
Dependent variable is indicator equal to one if a person has been in the plant for the past two years and is still present in the same plant
2 or more, 3 or more or 4 or more years later; it is equal to zero for all other new hires.
Worker controls: experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2, union membership.
Plant controls: shares of medium- and high-skill workers, log employment, log turnover, share of unionised workers,
exporter, importer and multiplant dummies.
Other controls: labour market region, year, 2-digit industry and 2-digit industry-year interaction terms.
Sample restricted to firms that are still in business in 4 years’ time.
In table 8 we look at the probability of workers, conditional on having worked in the same plant
also the two previous years, to remain in the plant for another 2, 3, or 4 years. The results suggest
29
that, measured from the year after an acquisition, all types of workers in plants subject to domestic
acquisitions are less likely to stay on for another two years relative to workers in non-acquisition
plants, but this effect is not significant for the 3- and 4-year horizon. For workers in plants subject
to foreign acquisitions the only significant coefficient indicates that the high-skilled workers who
were present in the plant before the acquisition are more likely to stay in the same plant than
those in plants not subject to acquisition over a 2-year horizon. Thus, to the extent that we can
approximate increased job satisfaction with the likelihood to remain in the plant, we do not see
much of an improvement among those remaining in the plant around acquisition.
Taken together we find evidence of increased selection on unobservable characteristics of new
hires after acquisitions, this is stronger in plants subject to foreign acquisitions. There is no clear
evidence of selection among the leaving workers. This process results in a significant increase in
average worker quality and match quality in plants subject to foreign acquisitions. The newly
hired workers in plants subject to foreign acquisitions are also rewarded with higher wage growth
compared to newly hired workers to non-acquisition plants. Workers who remain in a plant subject
to foreign acquisition from before to after the acquisition also experience somewhat higher wage
growth than similar workers in similar plants in the same industry and year. There is little evidence
of improved worker retention for stayers in plants subject to foreign acquisitions. Stayers in plants
subject to domestic acquisitions do not experience above average wage growth and have a lower
probability of staying on than similar workers in non-acquisitions plants, this effect is short-lived,
however.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the adjustments to plant size and the composition of the workforce that
occur around ownership change. Using detailed matched employer-employee data, we document
changes in measures of both observable worker characteristics such as skill and age as well as
measures of unobservable worker and match quality.
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We find excess labour turnover at the plant level around acquisitions, a feature that is more
pronounced around domestic acquisitions. Despite the excess turnover, we do not find evidence of
downsizing in plants subject to foreign acquisitions, and also no substantial changes to the skill
or age composition of the work force. In turn, in plants subject to domestic acquisitions we do
observe a reduction in the overall size of the labour force before the acquisition. This is associated
with an increase in the share of low-skilled workers at the expense of high-skilled workers. We
also document that the probability of separation is greater from the workers’ point of view during
a period of acquisition relative to other periods in their career. This is the case in particular for
high skilled workers in plants subject to domestic acquisitions, which may explain the negative
development in the high-skill share before domestic acquisitions. Excess separations are primarily
occurring before domestic ownership change, suggesting that this type of ownership change comes
after a period of difficulty for the plant.
From a management perspective an ownership change presents an opportunity for restructuring
and for improving the match between a plant and its employees. As we find little evidence of
changes along observable dimensions of a plant’s workforce, we move on to investigate whether
the workforce changes around acquisitions along several alternative measures of unobserved worker
and match quality. We find that the change in unobserved worker and match quality from two
years before to two years after domestic ownership change is not different from the change in
plants not subject to acquisitions in the same period and industry, while there is some evidence of
improvement along these unobservable match quality metrics in foreign acquisitions. By looking at
the distribution of the unobserved worker- and match-fixed effects, it is clear that the improvement
in average match quality comes from more selective hirings after foreign acquisitions. This picture
is confirmed by looking at the wage growth of movers: movers to plants that were just acquired
by foreign owners have higher wage growth than other movers.
We further look at the workers who stay in their plant from before to after ownership change,
only stayers in foreign acquisition plants have wage growth above the average of workers in non-
acquired plants in the same industry. As a final metric of match quality we look at the continuation
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tenure for workers in plants that are acquired, considering long tenure as one measure of a successful
match. For workers that remain in the plant from before to after acquisitions, especially the high-
skilled have a lower probability to stay on in plants subject to domestic acquisitions, while there
is no evidence of a deterioration in job attachment after foreign acquisitions.
Thus, our results suggest that from the perspective of plants subject to foreign acquisitions the
excess labour turnover associated with the acquisition results in improved match quality between
the plant and the workers. In plants subject to domestic acquisitions the ownership change is
associated with a substantial amount of excess labour turnover, the loss of high-skilled employees
prior to the acquisition which is partly reversed in the aftermath, but does not lead to an overall
improvement in match quality.
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Appendix
Table 9: Plant-level changes relative to non-acquired plants: age distribution
Change in dependent variable from
3 years before acquisition to year 1 year before acquisition to year
of acq 1 after 3 after 1 after 2 after 3 after
Dependent variable: Share of workers aged 14-29
Foreign acquisition -0.013 (∗) 0.008 -0.003 0.018 ∗∗ 0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Domestic acquisition 0.014 -0.003 0.018 -0.012 -0.008 0.008
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018)
R2 0.014 0.017 0.024 0.012 0.014 0.017
Dependent variable: Share of workers aged 30-39
Foreign acquisition 0.019 ∗ 0.008 0.010 0.003 -0.004 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Domestic acquisition -0.057 ∗∗ -0.003 -0.015 0.027 (∗) 0.006 0.004
(0.014) (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014) (0.024)
R2 0.018 0.017 0.029 0.011 0.017 0.023
Dependent variable: Share of workers aged 40-49
Foreign acquisition -0.003 -0.017 -0.010 -0.011 0.008 0.002
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Domestic acquisition 0.021 0.000 0.013 -0.001 -0.000 0.005
(0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
R2 0.007 0.010 0.016 0.005 0.007 0.010
Dependent variable: Share of workers aged 50-84
Foreign acquisition -0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 -0.005 -0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Domestic acquisition 0.022 0.009 -0.015 -0.014 0.002 -0.017
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Obs 39247 33696 23579 45092 39247 33696
R2 0.007 0.011 0.018 0.005 0.007 0.011
(∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions include region, year, 2-digit industry dummies and the level of employment at the start of the period.
To exclude mass-layoffs, the sample used drops observations where the change in employment from one year to the next
is in the top or bottom percentile.
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Table 10: Probability of separations and hires
All Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of separation
for acq t− 2 0.001 (0.002) -0.007 (0.004)(∗) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.005)
for acq t− 1 0.003 (0.002)(∗) 0.003 (0.004) -0.000 (0.002) 0.013 (0.005)∗∗
for acq t 0.008 (0.002)∗∗ 0.006 (0.005) 0.004 (0.003) 0.028 (0.005)∗∗
for acq t+ 1 0.019 (0.002)∗∗ 0.017 (0.005)∗∗ 0.015 (0.003)∗∗ 0.029 (0.006)∗∗
for acq t+ 2 0.005 (0.002)(∗) 0.001 (0.005) 0.006 (0.003)∗ 0.008 (0.005)
dom acq t− 2 0.026 (0.004)∗∗ 0.012 (0.006)(∗) 0.022 (0.004)∗∗ 0.077 (0.012)∗∗
dom acq t− 1 0.038 (0.004)∗∗ 0.016 (0.007)∗ 0.040 (0.005)∗∗ 0.073 (0.013)∗∗
dom acq t 0.034 (0.004)∗∗ 0.011 (0.008) 0.036 (0.006)∗∗ 0.080 (0.016)∗∗
dom acq t+ 1 0.027 (0.004)∗∗ 0.020 (0.007)∗∗ 0.025 (0.005)∗∗ 0.055 (0.012)∗∗
dom acq t+ 2 0.022 (0.004)∗∗ 0.005 (0.007) 0.030 (0.005)∗∗ 0.021 (0.012)(∗)
Obs 1261904 337153 739781 184970
R2 0.041 0.051 0.037 0.049
meanprob 0.055 0.058 0.052 0.062
Probability of hire
for acq t− 2 -0.000 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.005)
for acq t− 1 -0.009 (0.002)∗∗ -0.005 (0.003) -0.011 (0.002)∗∗ -0.007 (0.005)
for acq t -0.012 (0.002)∗∗ -0.004 (0.004) -0.014 (0.002)∗∗ -0.010 (0.005)∗
for acq t+ 1 -0.009 (0.002)∗∗ -0.003 (0.004) -0.010 (0.003)∗∗ -0.014 (0.006)∗
for acq t+ 2 0.009 (0.002)∗∗ 0.014 (0.004)∗∗ 0.007 (0.003)∗∗ 0.013 (0.006)∗
dom acq t− 2 -0.003 (0.003) -0.002 (0.006) -0.000 (0.004) -0.017 (0.010)(∗)
dom acq t− 1 0.000 (0.003) 0.004 (0.006) 0.000 (0.004) -0.008 (0.009)
dom acq t 0.016 (0.004)∗∗ 0.020 (0.007)∗∗ 0.010 (0.005)∗ 0.034 (0.013)∗
dom acq t+ 1 0.016 (0.004)∗∗ -0.002 (0.006) 0.014 (0.005)∗∗ 0.063 (0.014)∗∗
dom acq t+ 2 -0.015 (0.003)∗∗ -0.023 (0.005)∗∗ -0.010 (0.004)∗∗ -0.024 (0.011)∗
Obs 1261904 337153 739781 184970
R2 0.190 0.189 0.183 0.234
meanprob 0.061 0.059 0.056 0.084
(∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include worker fixed effects.
Worker controls: experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2, union membership.
Plant controls: shares of medium- and high-skill workers, log employment, log turnover, share of unionised workers,
exporter, importer and multiplant dummies.
Other controls: labour market region, year, 2-digit industry and 2-digit industry-year interaction terms.
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Table 11: Wage regressions
fixed effects worker- and plant job-spell
Dependent variable: log wage
Worker characteristics
experience 0.0356 (0.00262) ∗∗ 0.0776 (0.00336) ∗∗
experience2 -0.0003 (0.000003) ∗∗ -0.0003 (0.000003) ∗∗
tenure 0.0003 (0.00001) ∗∗ -0.0021 (0.00003) ∗∗
tenure2 0.0000 (3.9E-11) ∗∗ 0.0000 (4.0E-11) ∗∗
up to lower secondary -0.2128 (0.01466) ∗∗ .
started upper secondary -0.1992 (0.01198) ∗∗ .
completed upper secondary -0.1658 (0.01177) ∗∗ 0.0336 (0.00230) ∗∗
post-secondary non-tertiary -0.1515 (0.01243) ∗∗ 0.0072 (0.00601)
undergraduate degree -0.0860 (0.00847) ∗∗ -0.0568 (0.00990) ∗∗
graduate and higher omitted category omitted category
female * experience -0.0099 (0.00065) ∗∗ -0.0067 (0.00105) ∗∗
female * experience2 0.0001 (0.000007) ∗∗ 0.0002 (0.000008) ∗∗
female * tenure -0.0002 (0.00003) ∗∗ -0.0007 (0.00008) ∗∗
female * tenure2 0.0000 (9.4E-11) ∗∗ 0.0000 (9.4E-11) ∗∗
female * up to lower secondary -0.0687 (0.03852) (∗) .
female * started upper secondary -0.0473 (0.02839) (∗) -0.0558 (0.02024) ∗∗
female * completed upper secondary -0.0296 (0.02768) -0.0380 (0.01949) ∗
female * post-secondary non-tertiary -0.0004 (0.03207) .
female * undergraduate degree 0.0256 (0.01651) -0.0023 (0.01848)
union member -0.0099 (0.00070) ∗∗ -0.0090 (0.00072) ∗∗
new in plant -0.0392 (0.00060) ∗∗ -0.0379 (0.00059) ∗∗
about to leave plant 0.1419 (0.00059) ∗∗ 0.1339 (0.00061) ∗∗
Plant characteristics
log employment -0.0076 (0.00078) ∗∗ -0.0032 (0.00079) ∗∗
log value of production 0.0300 (0.00048) ∗∗ 0.0300 (0.00048) ∗∗
foreign-owned 0.0078 (0.00097) ∗∗ 0.0071 (0.00097) ∗∗
exporter dummy 0.0003 (0.00060) 0.0006 (0.00059)
importer dummy -0.0031 (0.00069) ∗∗ -0.0031 (0.00068) ∗∗
part of multiplant firm 0.0020 (0.00078) ∗∗ 0.0013 (0.00077) (∗)
share of high-skilled workers in plant 0.0503 (0.00515) ∗∗ 0.0524 (0.00515) ∗∗
share of medium-skilled workers in plant -0.0110 (0.00340) ∗∗ -0.0068 (0.00339) ∗
share of unionised workers in plant 0.0020 (0.00201) 0.0010 (0.00201)
Obs 1,571,411 1,571,411
R2 adj 0.78
F (worker + firm fe = 0), p-value 10.85 (0.00000)
Note: All regressions include industry, industry-year and region dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses, (∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗) p < 0.01.
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Figure 6: Cumulative distribution functions of unobserved spell fixed effects
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
 
−2 −1 0 1 2
 
Leaver
Stayer
New hire
Stayers, leavers and new hires: All plants
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
 
−2 −1 0 1 2
 
Stayer
New hire after dom. acq.
New hire after for. acq.
New hires versus stayers in acquisition plants
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
 
−2 −1 0 1 2
 
Stayer
Leaver after dom. acq.
Leaver after for. acq.
Leavers versus stayers in acquisition plants
Note: Cumulative distribution functions of the unobserved match-fixed effects predicted
from equation (3) with unobserved match-fixed effects instead of worker- and plant-fixed
effects. With acquisitions occurring in t, stayers are observed in the plant from t−2 to t+2.
New hires after acq. are new in; t, t+ 1 or t+ 2, leavers after acq. are leaving the plant in;
t, t + 1 or t + 2.
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Table 12: Overall change in match quality at the plant level around ownership change
Dropping plants with large downsizing
Change from before to after acquisition in the average
unobserved worker-fixed effect unobserved match-fixed effect
Change from 2 years before to 3 years after acquisition
Foreign acq 0.007 (0.003)∗ 0.019 (0.006)∗∗
Domestic acq 0.001 (0.005) -0.000 (0.010)
Change from 2 years before to 2 years after acquisition
Foreign acq 0.001 (0.003) 0.008 (0.006)
Domestic acq -0.007 (0.004) -0.018 (0.009)∗
Average fixed effect 0.030 0.023 0.034 0.028
Obs 19946 28911 19946 28911
R2 0.030 0.023 0.026 0.019
Note: All regressions include industry and year dummies and are weighted by the number of employees in
the plant. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the change in the plant-level average of unobserved
worker-fixed effects from a two-way fixed effect Mincer wage equation with plant- and worker-fixed effects,
including also worker and plant controls and region, industry and year interaction dummies. Dependent
variable in column 3 and 5 is the change in the plant-level average of unobserved match effects from a
Mincer wage equation with match effects, including the same controls. Standard errors in parentheses,
(∗) p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗) p < 0.01.
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